The debate over the foundations and boundaries of freedom of speech, once a matter of balancing the individual rights of unpopular speakers against broader social interests, took on a new shape in the 1980s when feminists began to advocate restrictions on pornography and critical race theorists to advocate restriction of certain kinds of hate speech. These challenges to traditional liberalism brought into sharp focus the issues of why we value free speech and how much weight it should be given against competing values. Difficult as it is to resolve these issues domestically, we now face new challenges arising from the increasingly rapid dissemination of information across international borders in an atmosphere of considerable political tension. The riots in response to the publication of Danish cartoons ridiculing Mohammed and the death threats against Salman Rushdie indicate how dramatically the stakes have been raised. At the same time, there is increased concern over discriminatory treatment of sexual minorities, Muslims, and immigrants. Against this background, the essays in this volume seek to illuminate why we value freedom of speech and expression and how this freedom can be weighed against other values, such as multicultural sensitivity, the rights of racial and sexual minorities, and the prevention of violence, both domestically and internationally.
How much does what we think depend on what we want? Descartes' much-discussed position has often been interpreted to mean that we hold an opinion as the result of a decision. In Scepticism, Freedom and Autonomy, Araujo argues against this interpretation, asserting that we retain control over our opinions only through selective attention. Even for this limited control, however, Cartesian Scepticism implies the possibility of self-delusion, symbolized in the writings of Descartes by the figure of the evil god. Hence, the existence of an evil god would not only cast doubt on our claims to knowledge but also jeopardize our freedom. In this new interpretation, the Cartesian Scepticism, which is usually ascribed only epistemic significance, proves relevant for a fundamental moral question, that of human autonomy in general.
Freedom of Information: A Practical Guide for UK Journalists is written to inform, instruct and inspire journalists on the investigative possibilities offered by the Freedom of Information Act. Covering exactly what the Act is, how to make FOI requests, and how to use the Act to hold officials to account, Matt Burgess utilises expert opinions, relevant examples and best practice from journalists and investigators working with the Freedom of Information Act at all levels.
The book is brimming with illuminating and relevant examples of the Freedom of Information Act being used by journalists, alongside a range of helpful features, including:
Supported by the online FOI Directory (www.foidirectory.co.uk), Freedom of Information: A Practical Guide for UK Journalists is a must read for all those training or working as journalists on this essential tool for investigating, researching and reporting.